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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

BYRON R-. GRIFFITHS,
Plaintiff a.nd R·espondenl,
-vs.-

Case No. 8154

SHIRLEY GRIFFITHS,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF ·OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In this case, "\Ve have the novel proposition of the
cart before the horse. 'The post-marital conduct of the
parties was but a eon'tinuation of the situation as it had
developed and existed fron1 some five or ·six years off
and on association between the parties before the marriage. The parties had kept company during that period
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of time and had beco1ne successiYely n1ore ineo1npatible
so that a normal marriage was co1npletely negated and
never developed. Then, on the eve of the plaintiff's induction into World War II, the plaintiff, from a kind,
hun1ane and generous motive, voluntarily married the
defendant to give her the status of a wife solely to give
her financial allotment support and soldier's death benefit because he knew he migh!t not return, (R. 15-16) all
of which he was not required to do. Thereafter, and consistent with the previ·ous history of the parties, it is
obvious that they both recognized that this was a n1arria.ge in name only.

Fro1n the date of plaintiff's induction the day follo\ving the marriage on Decen1ber 6, 1943, until his departure
for overseas from Camp Beal in N ove1nber, 1944, the
plaintiff was stationed in the states (R. 16) and his
\Vife could have accon1panied hi1n and lived with hun
during that year, as norn1ally she 'vould have done. But
nowhere in the record does she say she did that,
atten1pted it, or had any desire to live 'vith him. lie
had a 'vife in name only. ( R. 18) Her letters were ordinary 1na tter of fact letters. ( R. 17) She can1e to see hi1n
for about four da.ys before his departure overs~as. (R.
16), not a particularly impressive gesture even under
the circun1stances. Then, consistent with the plaintiff's
version, he wrote her for a divorce when he reached
IIa,vaii and knew definitely he was returning fro1n his
ar1ny ·service alive and ·the basis a.nd reason for this
Inarriage no longer existed (R. 18). The defendant dr-
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n1urred, and during the plaintiff's 90 day mustering out
period, the parties tried it again (R. 20).
During this period, the plaintiff proved act~s of mental cruelty by defendant sufficient to establish grounds
for the· divorce the court granted him. Defendant claimed
that her conduct was justified because it was occasioned
by plaintiff's drinking and the type of friends he associated with, but those were the same friends plaintiff
had before the marriage, (R. 58 and 79) and these friends
objectionable to defendant did not justify her conduct in
being unjustly suspicious, searching plaintiff's pockets
and embarrassing him "\vith calls to his friends, precipitating arguments by bringing up the past ( R. 21-22-23-24)
accusing him of giving her syphilis (R·. 5) (when she
\Vas just as much on the loose before the marriage when
they contracted syphili~s, as he was, and he was cured
\vithin a year and she still has it, indicating hers Inight
have had-an earlier start) etc.
I-Ier eonduct was such as to drive him back to the
army in June, 1946 ( R. 24, 25, 46).
For a year thereafter, defendant failed to join plaintiff and live "\Vi'th him as a wife (R. 25). There is son1e
correspondence in "\vhich he stated rents were high where
he was stationed, but when defendant made up her mind
to join him in Camp· Lee, she did ( R . 25). There, four
years after this mock marriage, and after plaintiff's
grounds of cruelty had accrued, defPndant finds the
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plaintiff in the company of another woman (R. 46)-her
firs't and only credible complaint of cruelty. It is uncontested that the plaintiff shipped this other girl out of
town forthwith (R. 48) the defendant condoned this incident (R. 25, 46) and the parties commenced living to~ether as husband and wife. ~rhe situation thereafter,
as vie"\ved by the court acting within its province, shows
that the defendant revived her former conduct (R. 2G,
·47) and, as the plaintiff testified, the situation was worse
than ever, there was constant quarreling and tension
at all tin1es and the parties spoke civilly only three or
four days out of a n1onth (R. 26), and the parties separated and have lived separate and apart since the fall
of 1947. There is nothing in the record to indicate that
the plain tiff ever 'Since said tin1e six years ago kept company with this woman (R. 57) or any other 'voman.

The plaintiff testified that he \Vas evacuated from
con1bat duty in l(orea in 1951 and hospitalized six weeks
for a disease called lichen planis, a disorder induced by
nervousness and worry 'vhich causes a breaking out of
the skin and terrific itching all over the body (R. 28).
lie testified that worry CJver his unwholeso1ne marital
relationship was definitely one of the causes of this
nervous disorder (R. 29) "wor~ying 1ne very 1nueh, upsetting me very much, and that my physical and mental
condition would improve if the relationship 'vere severed." ( R-. 29). Plain tiff was still ·suffering from this
disorder t\vo and a half years later at the ti1ne of trial
in J'une, 1953 (I~. 29). lie further testified that he 'vould
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not and did not want to live with Mrs. Griffiths as her
husband, that her conduct since the marriage had caused
him great mental ·distress and suffering and had defini'tely caused his health to suffer (R. 33).
On this reeord, the Court granted a divorce to the
plaintiff 'vho sought it. Appellant demurs to this, feeling
that because of his "brutality" in once having a woman
four years after this meaningless marriage was conceived, he should be denied a divorce and deprived of his
right to find happiness during his remaining life as a
penalty for having voluntarily married this defendant
in a hu1nane and merciful gesture 'vhere she alone stood
to reap the benefit.
STATE~fENT

OF POINTS OF APPELLANT

I.
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION WAS AGAINST THE
LAW.

II.
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
A FINDING IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF.

CONTRA ARGU1.fENT

I.
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION WAS AGAINST THE
LAW.

Appellant complains that the trial court's decision
the law because the basis of the Court's dewas ao-ainst
o

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

cision, according to appellant's theory, \Va.s t11a.t the husband proved minor acts of cruelty and had no desire for
_this marriage to continue, and the Court granted a divorce notwithstanding that the wife had ground and did
not desire a divorce. Even accepting appellant's theor~T'
how does the decision run contrary to the law~ If the
Court finds that there is evidence to support and prove
plaintiff's cause of action, the plaintiff is entitled to the
relief he seeks, without regard to the \vishes of the other
party. As for plaintiff proving "minor" acts ·of cruelty,
certainly the language of the C·ourt cannot be stronger
than as exp~ressed in its Findings of Fact concerning the
acts of cruelty by defendant toward plaintiff. Findings
No. 7 and 8 enumerating the specific acts of defendant's
cruelty eonstitute two full pages of the record and contain
just ~bout every act that a nagging, jealous, suspicious,
shre~ish wife could be guilty of. And then appellant
has the temerity to question the trial court's judg1nent
by saying such decision is shocking to one's sense of
good conscience, justice and decency because this spouse
\Vas "so guilty" and he·ca.use the \vife didn't \Vant a di'
vorce.
/·

·Of course she didn't \Vant a divorce·. IIer only conlplaint against hin1 throughout ten years was_ an isolated
instance of alleged adultery seven years ago, \vhereas he
supported and n1aintained her during all of this rnarriage
in exchange for living \vith her approxilnately four
1nonths during the ten years. On the other hand, she has
repaid him by 1na.king his life a hell on ea1ih \vhen they
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"\vere together, driving him back into the army to escape
her (R.. 24, Finding 7) and breaking his health to the
point of his suffering a serious disorder for the last three
years of this marriage. Is a decision severing such an unfair and unhealthy relationship "shocking to good conscience, justice and decency"~ And we will not unduly
burden this C·ourt with authorities that the trial judge
is the weigher of the evidence. There is ample evidence
in the stark record to support plaintiff's case, and from
the Court's Findings and judgment it is apparent that
he found the plaintiff credible and decided accordingly
that the plaintiff had proved his cause of action and was
entitled to a divorce.

Appellant cites Alldredge v. Alldredge, 229 P. 2d
681, Cordner v. Cordn.er, 61 P. 2d 601, and Doe v. Doe,
158 P. 781, that acts and conduct of a husband to a
wife may constitute cruelty, but before a decree is granted to a husband on similar grounds, "it ought to be some\vhat of an aggravated case." (Doe v. Doe). We cite the
record and the C·ourt's Findings to support that this
case is something even n1ore than "somewhat of an aggravated case."

Then appellant recites that where both parties are
guilty of grounds, this Court has recognized the
doctrine of comparative rectitude and grants a divorce to
the party least at fault (terming herself the party least
at fault), recognizing that the union should be severed.
8hould rc lief then be denied under identical circun1-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

s
stances, just because the party "least at fault" desires to
hang on 1to the hulk of a wrecked marriage for selfish
reasons inconsistent with the best interest of both parties.
Should one wronged party be left shackled in bondage
because of the selfish desires of the wrongdoer~ Appellant apparently thinks so, citing H endriclcs v. Hendricks,
257 P. 2d 366, as support that whatever the basis of the
doctrine of comparative rectitude, the simple equitable
rule of "clean hands" should bar Byron Griffith's action
for divorce here.

In the II endricks case, both parties claimed a divorce
and the court said surely the parties should be set apart
and the divorce granted to the one least at fault-the
doctrine of 'Comparative rectitude. Certainly, that is
logical and you \vould not expect the court to grant the
divorce to the one most at fault where both sought a
divorce. Defendant further says that the Hendricks
case holds that where either spouse is accused of the con1n1ission of a felony, adultery, or any other heinous offense, the doctrine of comparative rectitude \vill not
apply. A close reading of this case \vill disclose that that
is not \vhat .the court says. It says:

"There are undoubtedly so1ne circumstances,
~such as JnuJu,al conviction of a felony, adultery, or
other serious offenses \vhich Inay justify a court of
equity in refusing to grant relief. Whether this
he recrimination or the "clean hands" doctrine is
of no i1nportanc.e here. To affirnz. that a guilty
szJouse is nfver entitled to a di.vorce is a positioll
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difficult to apply to the facts of life. It is seldorn, perhaps never, that any wholly innocent
party seeks a divorce against one who is wholly
guilty. . . . Although some statutes specify that
a divorce may be granted to 'the party not in fault'
our staltde wisely contains no such provision."
The court then recites its policy of taking into consideration the practical exigencies of such situations.
In vie,ving the practical exigencies of the Hendricks
1narriage, it granted a divorce to the one least at fault
where no good purpose, either social, moral, ethical, or
legal, could be served by eompelling these two people,
clearly ill-suited and maladjusted to each other, to continue the legal relationship of husband and wife. The
identical situation exists in the Griffiths case. Should
the court refuse to grant a divorce to the plaintiff simply
because the wife doesn't seek a divorce and thereby merely lessens the burden on the court of weighing the niceties
of the cruelty of each to decide "\vho was least at fault~
Also, Finding 10 recites that plaintiff's past cruelty and
adultery was condoned by the defendant and never revived
after the parties resumed CfJhabitation in Virginia in 194 7.
As stated, her only worthy claim of cruelty on the
part of respondent toward her during their marriage was
his alleged adultery, and the evidence of both parties is
in accord that the appellant forgave her husband, condoned his conduct, and they thereafter cohabited and
lived together as husband and wife in Virginia for
about three months. There is no evidence in the record
that the plaintiff ever repeated or revived the condoned
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conduct, and appellant is therefore left bereft of the
cruelty with which she now so volubly brands the respondent. So how does the Hendricks case support her
when there is no adultery left~
An extensive annotation of 74 pages con1mencing
at p. 102 of 32 ALR 2d fully reviews and cites cases restating the well-accepted rule that condonation followed
by cohabitation without the offender repeating or reviving the condoned conduct thereafter, will bar the injured
party frorn raising such previously condoned conduct as
grounds for divorce. The headnote case, Brown v.
Brown, Kan., 232 P. 2d 603, was an appeal from a divorce
granted to the husband, the 'vife contesting the sufficiency of the husband's evidence and the failure of the
court to recognize her defense of condonation by the
hushand. The divorce 'vas affirmed, the husband's evidence of cruelty consisting of the wife's expressing disapproval of the appellee's choice of jobs, his fa1uily, his
hobbies and recreation cl~oices, their houses and furniture, and her constant nagging pertaining to the way he
drove a car, his smoking, drinking and so forth. We cite
this c:r'uelty, which 'vas deen1ed adequate to support the
granting of a divorce to the husband, because it so closely
parallels the cruel acts set forth by respondent as having
been corn1nitted by his wife in the instant case. In the
Brown case, the review court rejected the "rife's defense
of condonation, since she repeated her cruel conduct after
her husband's condonation thereof. The trial judge in
the case before this Court found that appellant repeated
her cruel conduct 'vhen she lived 'vith respondent in
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·virginia for sorne three n1onths after his condonation
of her former cruelty and their subsequent cohabitation.
(Finding No. 9)

Appellant cites the case of Clark v. Clark, Ne'v ~lex.,
225 P. 2d 147, and states in her brief that this cas.e answers the question presented in the case now before the
court, ~'Does recrimination afford a valid defense in a
suit for divorce sought on the grounds of incompatibility." However, "\Ve think the Clark case supports the
plaintiff's position and not the defendant's in that it af- .
fir1ns the right of the trial judge to use his discretionary
po,vers in trying and deciding equity cases. The Clark
case holds nothing more than that the trial judge should
have adn1itted proffered evidence of the husband's adultery and then weighed it in deciding the rnatter. The
\vife tendered proof of her husband's a.dt~.ltery in support
of her recriminatory defense of incoinpatihility to heT·
husband's suit based on incoinpatihility. The trial judge
held the adultery offered by the defendant in support
of her defense was iminaterial and excluded proof of it,
since the courts had ruled th.a.t incompatahility is not a
recrhninatory defense to incoinpatibility, and granted a
divorce to the husb-and pursuant to the latest New ~1exico
case of Pavletich v. Pavletich, 174 P. 2d 832, which held
that a divorce should be grarnted u·here the parties were
irreconcilable, the trial judge having dete-r1nined that the
husband had adduced sufficient proof of incon1patihility
on his "\vife's part to show that the parties 'vere irreconci_lahle.
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Mrs. Clark appealed the rejection of the offered
proof on the grounds that although incompatibility is not
as such a recriminatory defense to incompatibility, yet
it was the adultery that had induced and caused the incompatible acts of the wife and the evidence to that effeet should have been admitted. The Supreme Court
held that under such a situation, possibly the adultery
could have been the cause of the wife's incompatibility
and therefore sent the case back for a new trial wherein
the trial judge should admit and consider the adultery
and then decide \vhether the husband was still entitled
to a divorce notwithstanding the adultery.

This holding is squarely in support of the Court's
decision in the Griffiths matter. Here the trial judge
admitted and weighed the husband's association with another woman and thereafter granted a divorce to plaintiff after considering this evidence. The Clark case says
nothing more than that the court should consider this
evidence and then render a decision consistent with the
exercise of the eourt's discretion after \veighing all the
evidence. The trial court in the instant case did exactly
\vhat the Clark case said the court had a duty to do, and
then decided in favor of the plaintiff, which the Clark
case says the court had a right to do.

Further, \Ve are in accord with the reasoning expressed in the Pavletich case, supra, that a divorce
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should be granted to one party or the other where the
record sho\vs the irreconcilability of the parties.

Appellant further con1plains that the Court erred in
believing that 1nental cruelty once Inade out by the husband 1nandatorily required the granting of a divorce
regardless of \vhat had occasioned the cruelty or how
guilty the plaintiff hi1nself 1night have been, so long as
defendant had not asked for a.ffir1native relief and the
1narriage seemed hopeless, apparently basing her opinion on a passing obse-rvation of the Court at R. 31 that
'·the df~fendant is not eontesting the divorce."

Regardless of "\vhat the court said, \vha.t the court did
is vvhat is important. I-Iow can the defendant say the action was uncontested when the court let in all of the testimony the defendant had, regardless of whether it was
pleaded or nbt. Although the defendant did not counterclaim for a divorce, she contested it by saying the plaintiff was not entitled to a divorc-e and she introduced all
the evidence she desired to negate plain tiff's evidence.
I-Io,vever, the trial court after weighing all of the evidence in the case sa\v fit to grant the plaintiff a. divorce
and 've think justly and equitably so.

vVe note in pass1ng that appellant's brief remarks
in one place of the "guilt" and "n1ost serious Inisconduct"
of the plaintiff, and in another place, of the plaintiff being guilty of "such shocking conduct.'' In view that the de-
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fendant believes this to be true and so alleges in her brief
we are at a loss to find any' other conclusion for her'
not wanting to have a divorce in this matter or lettin(}'
b
the plaintiff have a divorce, except for her own vindictiveness and selfishness or desire for personal gain
from allutment p-rotection, and the Court in Finding 12
so finds her motives to be in resisting this divorce.

POINT II.
INSUFFJ,CIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE.

The ap~p:ella.nt claims the evidence is insufficient to
justify the. decision, since the only cruel acts of defendant
happened durin&' a 90 day period in 1946 and were justified beeause of plaintiff's conduct. Appellant attempts.
to invade the province of the court and deter1nine this
case on the basis of the evidence as she believes it. There
is no question in our minds but that the court took into
consideration the novel and peculiar nature of this particular marriage and all of the evidence as a whole, in
reaching its decision. That is the very purpose of the
trial court, to weigh all the evidence, and determine the
case in accordance with whom and 'vhat evidence the
court chooses to believe. The court detern1ined, as set
forth in its Findings of Fact, that the defendant had
been guilty of sufficient acts of cruelty toward plaintiff
to cause hi1n grevious 1nental suffering and undermine
his health and warrant the awarding of a divorce to
him.. Certainly the court can believe one as against the
other, particularly 'vhen defendant's testi1nony IS so
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anomalous. For instance, after finding plaintiff at Can1p
Lee with another wo1nan, the defendant condoned pl~ain
tiff and started living with him. She attempted to impress the co-urt that the association was never thereafter
mentioned and caused no difficulty or concern between
them-that they lived as t\vo doves in a cote (P. 64). Her
falling off and losing weight was due to "climatic conditions" (P. 64). If that was the true loving situation bet,veen them, ~-hen why did she demand and receive a
statement from plaintiff that he \vould not use her departure as grounds for desertion, when she left Can1p
Lee and returned to Salt Lake City.

'l.,he appellant cites the case of Aldredge v. Aldredge,
Utah 229 P. 2d 681, which recites that a review court
has the duty and power to determine the facts for itself.
IIowever, in this case, if the eourt will please note I-Ie·adnote No. 2 and also page 682, Note No. 1 and 2, it states
as follo,vs :

"In her appeal, the first contention of the
defendant is that there is no evidence in the record
upon which the court could find defendant guilty
of mental cruelty. As this case is an equity case,
this court has the duty and the po,ver to detern1ine
the facts for itself. I:Iowever, as was held in Doe
v. Doe, 48 Utah 200, 158 J>. 781, 786, and Schuster
v. Schuster, 88 Utah 257, 53 P. 2d 428, we will
not up·set findings of the trial court on issues in
which the testimony was in conflict, unless the record shows that such findings are clearly against
the vveight of the evjdence. See also Stanley v.
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Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 94 P. 2d 465; this because
the trial cou,rt· has a better opportunity to ju.dge
the credibility of the witnesses and the weight
of their testimon.y. Especially is this trne in cases
involving quarrels between spouses."
The C'ourt will readily see from what is quoted in this
case and as set out hereinabove that the trial judge is
always the one who has the opportunity to note the demeanor of the witnesses before him and note the manner
in which they give their testiinony and also to note the
conflicts of the tes·timony and therefore is always in a
better position to be a judge of the veracity of the witness
or witnesses. And our Supreme Court has s'o held in
many, many cases. Also, if the Court will take a moment
in which to read the Findings of F·act that the Court
signed, and we refer particularly to Paragraphs 8, 12, 13,
and 14, of the Findings of the Court, it \vill there note
that the C'ourt evidently, because of the conflict in the
testimony, believed the plaintiff as oagainst the defendant
and as a result thereof placed n1ore weight on the testimony of the plaintiff than that of the defendant and
thereafter, a.s a matter of course, granted a divorce to the
plain tiff herein on the grounds of cruelty.
The defendant also cite·s the case of Cordne'r v. Cordner, Utah, 61 P. 2d 601, \vherein he states that a trial
court's finding will he upset "\vhere the record shows such
findings are clearly against the weight of the evidence
and, of course, \Ve agree with that statement of the la\v.
J!owever, in the instant case, the evidence \vas so vastly
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different and so rnuch stronger and carried so n1uch 1nore
·weight than it did in the Cordner case that there is no
con1parison. Also the Cordner case was not particularly
decided on the evidence and testimony but on the pleadings of the Complaint, whether or not it stated a cause
of acti:on as against a general demurrer, and the Supre1ne
Court ruled that the Cornplaint did not state a cause of
action. Just by way of passing and quoting fron1 page
G03 of the Cordner case, we find as follows : "There is no
allega.tiion of constant nagging, harassing, or annoying
conduct, no rebuking of plaintiff publicly or p-rivately
'vith intent to humiliate plaintiff or to injure his character or reputation." (indicating such allegations 'vould
state a cause of action.) The language of the Supre1ne
Court indicates that a contrary decision w·ould have been
reached if these allegations had been pleaded. The instant case not only has practically all these allegations,
hut there is ample evidence in the record to supp,ort
them. Also again, we must ask the Court to keep in mind
Findings N o.'s 8, 12, 13, and 14, which are Findings 1na.de
by the trial court 'vhich support the qut>ted statement
hereinabove made by the Supre1ne Court.

In Pinion v. Pinion, Utah, 67 P. 2d 267, 've 'vish to
call the Court's attention to what is stated in this case
at Page 268, which is as follows:
''Even in an equity case, we do not overturn
the judgment unless it is fairly against the preponderance of the evidence. ~ehe writer believes
that every intenchnent should he in favor o£ the
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trial. court, for not only does he in a divorce case
have the parties before hi1n, enabling him to test
credi·bility by demeanor, but the conduct and
manner of the parties in the court room sometunes
gives much aid in solving who really is at fault.
Moreover, a trial judge may 'live with' a divorce
proceeding in its preliminary stages and know
it from angles which the record does not disclose."

Now, we turn to the case of Anderson v. Anderson,
Utah 138 P. 2d 254, quoted by the appellant in her brief,
and we refer the Court particularly to Page 254, wherein
our Supreme Court says a.s follo,vs:

.-

t

·~

"At the outset, it must be conceded that if
the matters alleged in the complaint actually took
place, it would be sufficient grounds of cruelty
to warrant granting a divorce .to plaintiff. vVhile
the evidence is conflicting, the court found the
allegations to be true. There is sufficient evidence to support such findings of the trial court.
It m<tltSt be re·membered that the lower court saw
the witnesses, a;n.d in a case of this kind much
could be determined from their demeanor and
the way in which they answered the questions
p·ut to them in court. There were certain. inconsi.ste·ncies _in the. testimony of defendant. From
this and from the trial cou.rt's observation of witnesses' demeanor the tr-ial court d.etermined tha.t
her testimony was not entitled to the sam.e credibility a.s plaintiff's.
"As we have only the cold record before us,
we rannot say that the lower court was in error
in this conclusion. vVe affirn1 the findings of the
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lower court on Issues presented by plaintiff's
Con1plaint."

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we 'vould like to state to the Court our
position based and keeping in mind the overall picture
drawn f:rom all of the evidence introduced in this case.
We think that it simmered down to merely this : r~rwo
pe·ople who have been 1narried in na1ne only for approxiInately ten years and have lived together not n1ore than
six 1nonths during this whole ten year p·eriod. ·At intervals when they have gotten together, they have quarreled,
disagreed, fought, and nagged continuously, and incessantly and enjoyed nothing in common, and we see no
reason or logic 'vhy two people should be forced to live together under these uncongenial, emotionally upsetting circumstances. VVhat could be more shocking than to have
people such as these living among society and constantly
arguing, nagging, and harassing each other in public,
a1nong their friends, and in th.eir hon1e and otherwise.
vVe further think that the Findings Inade by the trial
court in this case were of a very substantial nature by
virtue of the evidence introduced in this record and one
\vill note by reading particularly the Findings of Fact,
No.'s 8, 12, 13, and 14 that the court believed those Findings of Fact to be true as against all the evidence that
might have been and was introduced, \vhether pleaded
or not, by the defendant in this case. We want to further
state that \Ve think legally and logically tha.t the trial
court finding the issues in favor of the plaintiff for a.
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divorce on grounds of cruelty in this action was unquestionably p.roper and within its province, and we are
confident that this Court in reviewing the Findings made
by the trial court should have no hesitancy in affirrning the trial court's decision under the overwhelming
factual circumstances adduced by plaintiff.

In closing, we cite. Finaing No. 14, which reiterates
the very language and reasoning under which the Hendricks divorce "\Vas granted by ruling of this Court: "The
legitimate ends of matrimony in this case appear definitely to have been lost and destroyed beyond hope of
redemption .... It ap·p·ears that no good purpose, either
social, moral, ethical or legal, will be served by requiring these parties to continue a relationship that is a
mockery of the true concept of matrimony, the parties
being clearly ill suited and maladjusted toward each
other and having n_o interests in common to continue
the legal relationship, of husband and wife."
Res·pectfully submitted this 26th day of July, 1954.

MARY CONDAS LEHMER
JOE P. BOSONE
Attorneys for Plantiff and
Respondent

4:05 Felt Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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